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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
M IAM I DIVISION
CA SE NO. 12-2221 I-CIV-KIN G
RAANAN KATZ,
Plaintiff,
IRINA CHEVALDINA ,
Defendant.
/
ORDER DENYING M O TION TO DISM ISS
THIS M ATTER comes before the Court upon Defendant's Second M otion to Dismiss
(DE #14), filed August 10, 2012. Therein, Defendant alleges that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. ln short, Defendant acknowledges using
Plaintiff s copyrighted pictlzre without Plaintiffs consent, but argues that she was not liable for
' f ir use doctrine. The Court, being fully briefed on the matter,'infringement under copyright s a
finds that Plaintiff has adequately stated a prima facie case of copyright infringement; on these
facts and filings, Defendant's fair use defense is not appropriate for determination on a motion to
dismiss. Accordingly, Defendant's motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) must be denied.
Plaintiff Raanan Katz is a real estate developer and minority owner of the M iami Heat.
Defendant Irina Chevaldina is the proprietor and author of several blogs critical of Katz and his
business activities. ln his Amended Complaint (DE //10), filed June 12, 2012, Plaintiff alleges
that he owns the copyright in a picture of himself photographed in Israel in early 201 1 (the
l Plaintiff filed a Response (DE /18) on September 6, 20 l2. Defendant replied (DE #20) on September 14, 2012.
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Ctlmage') and that Defendant reproduced the Image on multiple occasions without permission.
(DE #1, !! 7-9). Plaintif further aleges that Defendant's tmauthorized use of the lmage
constitutes copyright infringement, pursuant to 17 U.S.C. j 501, by violating Plaintiff s
exclusive rights in the Image. (f#. at !! 13-14). He seeks actual dnmages as well as a permanent
injunction against Defendant (lcopying, displaying or otherwise using the lmage' and an order
that Defendant destroy any existing copies of the lmage. (f#. at !! (A)-(D)). Defendant, in her
Second M otion to Dismiss, does not dispute Plaintiff's factual pleadings. Indeed, she
acknowledges using the lmage without permission. See, e.g. , (DE #14, p. 7) Cschevaldina's use
of the image for commentary and criticism of Katz is a classic fair use.''). Instead, Defendant
claims that copyright's fair use doctrine, which provides a full affirmative defense to a copyright
infringement claim when applicable, see L atimer v. Roaring Toyz, Inc., 601 F.3d 1224, 1239
(1 1th Cir. 2010), immunizes her from liability.
The question now before the Court is whether Defendant's fair use defense is ripe for
determination on a motion to dismiss.
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must include (tenough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face,' Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570,
127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007). The court generaly is limited in its review to the (lfotr comers of the
complaint' Speaker v. US. Dep 't. ofHealth & Human Servs., 623 F.3d 1371, 1379 (1 1th Cir.
2010), and must accept a11 well-pled factual allegations as true. Erickwn v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94, 127 S. Ct. 2 197 (2007). The Court does not make factual determinations in evaluating a
motion to dismiss. Hawthorne v. Mac A6lustment, Inc., 140 F.3d 1367, 1370 (1 1th Cir. 1998). lf
the complaint's allegations are plausible under the alleged facts, then the court must view them
2
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in the light m ost favorable to the plaintiff. Am. Dental Ass 'n v.
1289 (11th Cir. 2010).
Cigna Corp.s 605 F.3d 1283,
It is easy to see why a fair use defense typically cannot be analyzed upon a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion. SçFair use is a mixed question of law and fact.'' Harper (:t At?w Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985). There is no categorical listof fair uses, but criticism,
commentary, news reporting, parody, and teaching tend to lend themselves to such a finding. See
' d termination involves weighing at least four statutory factors,z17 U
.S.C. j 107. The court s e
which usually requires making factual findings or relying ön undisputed or admitted material
facts. Browne v. Mccain, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1 125, 1 130 (C.D. Cal. 2009). Strfhus, in light of a
court's narrow inquiry at this stage and limited access to a11 potentially relevant and material
facts needed to undertake the analysis, courts rarely analyze fair use on a 12(b)(6) motion.' Id at
1 130; see also L achapelle v. Fenty 812 F. Supp. 2d 434, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
There is litle judicial precedent and none in this Circuit or Court to the contrary.
lndeed, this Court's Rule 12(b)(6) cases cited by Defendant have no connection to copyright 1aw
d are inapplicable to this case.3 overlooking the corpus of copyright law
, 
Defendant's motion
fails to explain why the above-styled action should be the exception to the general rule that fair
4 f dant'suse defenses are not ripe for determination before the summary judgment stage. De en
2 These non-exhaustive factors are:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprotk educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work,
17 U.S.C. j 107.3 See DE #14
, pp. 6-7 (citing Freeman v. Key L argo Volunteer Fire tf Rescue Dep '( Inc. 841 F. Supp. 2d 1274
(S,D. Fla. 2012); f enbro Holding, Inc. v. Falic, No. l 1-CV-22799, 201 1 WL 4706194 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 4, 20l 1:.
The fonner case concerns the Fair Labor Standards Act and the latter a guaranty contract.
4 Sdgllt is wel established that a court can resolve the issue of fair use on a motion for summary judgment,''
f eadsinger, lnc. v. BMG Music Pub., 512 F.3d 522, 530 (9th Cir. 2008), (dlilf there are no genuine issues of material
fact, or if, even after resolving al1 issues in favor of the opposing party, a reasonable trier of fact can reach only one
conclusion . . , .' Fuentes v. Mega Media Holdings, Inc., No. 09-CV-22979, 201 1 WL 2601356 at *6 (S.D. Fla.
Case 1:12-cv-22211-JLK   Document 21   Entered on FLSD Docket 10/05/2012   Page 3 of 6
sole authority for granting her m otion is the recent Seventh Circuit decision in Brownmark
Films, L L C v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2012). Brownmark has yet been applied
only in the southern and northern districts of lllinois and does not control in this Court. M ore
importantly, the facts of this case and nature of the pleadings do not fit within the Brownmark
frnmework. The distinctions are dispositive.
First, in Brownmark the plaintiff alleged a single infringing use: the defendant's
derivative exploitation of the plaintiff s copyrighted video in one episode of (tsouth Park'' titled
dscanada on Strike.'' In the instant case, Plaintiff Katz alleges that Defendant Chevaldina has
published numerous infringing copies of the lmage. At least one of those copies was published
after the initiation of the above-styled action and in direct reference to this lawsuit. See (DE #14-
1, p. 16). Accordingly, whereas 'tsouth Park's' fair use argument could be evaluated within a
single context, the Court's analysis of Defendant Chevaldina's fair use argument may differ
depending on the various contexts of the lmage's use.
Second, the plaintiff in Brownmark did tçnot even botherg) to address the substance of the
fair use question, providing thlel court with absolutely no indication of any evidence or factors
outside of the episode in question that could even possibly influence the resolution of the fair use
issue in the plaintiff s favor.'' Brownmark Films, LL C v. Comedy Partners, 800 F. Supp. 2d 991,
999 (E.D. Wis. 201 1). Conversely, in the instant case Plaintiff filed a lengthy Response to the
motion to dismiss (DE #18) that focuses on refuting Defendant's fair use defense.
Third, the Seventh Circuit in Brownmark emphasized that a fair use defense in which the
infringing work is parody is more likely to be ripe for resolution upon a motion to dism iss than
other fair uses. 682 F.3d at 692. Here, Defendant alleges that her use of the Image was not for
June 9, 201 1) (quoting Worldwide Church ofGod v. Philadelphia Church ofGoi Ac., 227 F.3d 1 l 10, l 1 15 (9th
Cir. 2000:. Even this relatively recent development is a departure from the common 1aw understanding of fair use
as a factual issue for the jury. See generaly Ned Snow, Fair Use as a Mater /./-1- , 89 DENV. U. L. REV. l (201 1).
4
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parody but for news reporting and commentary. (DE #14, p. 10). Though news reporting and
commentary lend themselves to fair uses, see 17 U.S.C. j 107, such a determination is far from
automatic and is more appropriately resolved after the complaint has been answered and parties
have evaluated any need for discovery.
Accordingly, after careful consideration and the Court being otherwise fully advised, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that Defendant's Second Motion to Dismiss (DE
#14) be, and is hereby, DENIED. Defendant shall ANSW ER Plaintiff's Amended Complaint on
or before October 26, 2012.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at the James Lawrence King Federal Justice
Building and United States Courthouse, M iami, Florida, this 5th day of October, 2012.
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